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On October 18th I (Ben) posted an article titled 'Are you giving credit when due?' This is a follow-up on that article.

Might the ability to conduct a practical workplace experiment be a) vastly overlooked and b) absolutely essential to improvement or even just change? We believe so; our evidence follows.

A leader in any situation, being work, sport or conflict such as the World Wars, cannot get the results themselves. If we try (‘easier to do it myself’) we will become quickly overburdened, quickly finding our goal is impossible. There is only one choice; create real followers who by nature will trust us, cooperate with us, and provide us with honest feedback.

At Story Construction (Iowa), in the last month, four leaders practiced workplace experimenting. For each this took 8 hours - about 5% of their work time assuming a 40 hour week. Such an approach to improvement probably won’t be for everyone at Story. But let’s conservatively assume it will be for 50%. They employ about 160 people thus, in a year or two’s time, 80 people may well be spending 5% of their work time experimenting - there’s 160 hours per week of experimenting going on at Story (alongside ‘getting the job done’). Just imagine that …

Engagement – who holds the power? Where does the primary obligation to be engaged lie? With the staff member, or with those who have the opportunity to create an ‘engaging environment’? We feel it’s the latter. Quite simply, staff won’t be inclined to engage in a non-engaging space! Therefore fundamentally it’s not ‘up to them’, it’s up to us. The staff will determine their level of engagement! So what can we do?

I (Ben) feel that sometimes we get so busy ‘doing’ we go into auto pilot and, as a result, often miss the true intent or value. We start to become transactional!

‘Making-do’ as a waste refers to a situation where a task is started without all its required inputs, or we choose to continue to do a task when a required input ceases to be available.

I was working with a client recently and a comment then a following ‘NON’ action really got me thinking.

Since April 20 we have published a series of articles focussed on questions a manager can ask their frontline leaders to gauge the chances of sustaining consistent desired results. Within there is an implicit skill that needs to be made explicit – the handling of problems.

Where are we in this series? Our frontline leaders can easily and consistently identify any difference between WHAT SHOULD BE HAPPENING and WHAT IS ACTUALLY HAPPENING; they are applying a robust training system thus addressing ‘don’t know, can’t do’; they have habits and a skill to address ‘does know, can do, but isn’t doing’.

Where are we in this series? Our frontline leaders can easily and consistently identify any difference between WHAT SHOULD BE HAPPENING and WHAT IS ACTUALLY HAPPENING, and they are applying a robust training system thus addressing ‘don’t know, can’t do’. So, what’s next and necessary for system stability?

You’re a frontline manager leading a ‘people-based system’ producing a product or service and your front line leaders can easily and consistently identify any difference between WHAT SHOULD BE HAPPENING and WHAT IS ACTUALLY HAPPENING. What’s next and necessary for system stability?

You’re a frontline manager leading a ‘people-based system’ producing a product or service. Daily you ‘walk the floor’ building strength in the system through understanding then responding to answers to 4 questions posed to your frontline leaders.

A frontline manager can be viewed as a person leading a (production or service) system where their primary asset is their people, in particular their frontline leaders, through whom the manager will get their operational results.

Would you do something that makes you feel uncomfortable if it benefits the objective, the group and production?

Richard De Crespigny, captain of A380 Qantas Flight 32 that blew an engine out of Singapore in 2010, speaks of the value to him of having his slow mind ‘available’ such that he could problem solve scenarios that had never before been experienced in simulated or real flight.